Please Don’t Feed the Homeless:
Pottinger Revisited
Shirley D. Howell 1
Preface
Your house is your larger body
It grows in the sun and sleeps
In the stillness of the night;
And it is not dreamless 2
Summary:
In the late 1980’s, major cities began relentless campaigns to rid the
streets and parks of the homeless. Thousands of homeless families and
individuals were subjected to arrest and summary destruction of their
possessions for minor offenses such as jaywalking and dropping a leaf on
the ground. In 1988 the homeless brought action against the City of Miami
alleging numerous violations of constitutional rights. While the Pottinger
litigation was pending, Hurricane Andrew left over 200,000 additional
individuals homeless in Miami.
In 2005, Hurricane Katrina added approximately 1.5 million members
to America’s homeless population, bringing the total to approximately five
million. During the one-year since Hurricane Katrina struck, Americans
have begun to show unmistakable signs of compassion fatigue.
Las Vegas has already passed an ordinance which imposes maximum
fines of $1,000.00 for feeding the homeless in a public park. This Article
explores the relevance of Pottinger in Post-Hurricane Katrina society.
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Introduction
In 1998, Miami’s homeless population filed a class action, Pottinger
v. City of Miami,3 alleging that city officials acted in concert to deprive
them of their civil rights. While the Pottinger litigation was ongoing,
Hurricane Andrew struck Miami, leaving 200,000 additional homeless in its
wake 4 in what the Pottinger court termed “a worst possible” 5 scenario. It
was the first time that a hurricane figured in homelessness litigation, and it is
likely that the outcome of the case was in fact affected by the hurricane. The
court held Miami officials liable for violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983,6 the
Eighth Amendment,7 the Fourth Amendment,8 the Due Process Clause,9 and
the Right to Travel,10 perhaps in part because the tragedy of mass
homelessness was showcased by Hurricane Andrew. In the face of so great
a homeless population, the Court could not dismissively assume that people
were homeless as a result of a perverse desire to be so, nor would it ignore
the multiple violations of their constitutional rights.
The similarities between the homelessness scenarios created by
hurricanes Andrew and Katrina are startling, each storm leaving behind an
unassimilated, newly homeless population to join the already burgeoning
ranks of America’s homeless population. Compassion is already wearing
thin, and evacuees are being ousted from temporary lodging. If adequate
societal measures are not taken to house these evacuees, they will be forced
to live in the streets, parks, and under bridges, as were the Pottinger
plaintiffs.
This article will explore the relevance of Pottinger as the homeless
population rises to approximately five million in the twenty first century.
Part I summarizes the demographics and causes of mass homelessness. Part
I also addresses negative public reactions to the increased visibility of the
homeless in major American cities.
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Part II articulates the thesis of the Article. Part III outlines and
discusses the successful causes of action brought by the homeless in
Pottinger v. Miami. And Part IV, the conclusion, sets forth proposals that
would reinvigorate incentives to construct additional affordable housing,
revisit America’s regressive tax schedule, and afford the homeless suspect
classification.
I.
Overview of Homelessness Before Hurricane Katrina
a.
Demographics
In 2000, an estimated two million Americans were homeless on any
given night.11 Between 2.5 and 3.5 million Americans experienced
homelessness every year,12 and thirty percent of the homeless had been
without homes for more than two years.13 These numbers do not include the
indeterminate number of individuals who had no homes and were “doubled
up”14 living with friends or relatives. Only those persons “who lack a
permanent address and sleep in places not designed to be sleeping
accommodations for human beings…and those living in shelters”15 were
considered homeless; thus, those living under the roofs of their families and
friends did not meet the definition.
Adult males constituted 44% of the homeless population before
Hurricane Katrina.16 Women17 accompanied by minor children18 were the
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fastest growing segment of the chronically homeless19 and made up 36% of
the homeless population.20 Some 750,000 children were homeless21 before
Katrina and 1.5 million elderly had “worst case housing needs.”22 Fifty
percent of the homeless were African-American, 35% White, 12% Hispanic,
2% Native American, and 1% were Asian Americans.23
b.
The Causes
The causes of America’s rising homelessness rate have been debated
for decades. Some contend that personal deficiencies such as mental
illness,24 substance abuse,25 incarceration,26 and an intergenerational
dependence upon welfare27 are the primary causes of homelessness. Others
cite macro economic factors such as loss of low-income housing,28
unemployment and underemployment,29 and a regressive tax structure.30
Neither theory considered natural disasters.
c.
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Public Reaction
Years before Hurricane Katrina created the largest homeless
population in American history, the public had developed compassion
fatigue31 with homelessness. San Francisco enacted a series of ordinances
through its so-called Matrix Program that criminalized sleeping in a park,
begging near a highway, and blocking a sidewalk.32 Eleven thousand of San
Francisco’s poorest people were incarcerated as a result of the Matrix
Program33 alone. In Santa Anna, the homeless were rounded up, transported
to a football stadium, physically marked with numbers, chained for hours,
and ultimately released to a different location.34
Massachusetts imposed criminal sanctions upon those who “move
about from place to place begging.”35 Alabama made it a criminal act to
wander about “in a public place for the purpose of begging.”36
In Florida, which was the venue for Pottinger, homelessness had
increased dramatically in Miami since 1984.37 Thousands of homeless
individuals were sleeping in Bicentennial Park38 and other public venues
where they kept their meager belongings, which typically included blankets,
clothing, food, identification, eyeglasses, and sometimes medications.39 City
police were directed “to identify food sources for the poor and to arrest
and/or force an extraction of the undesirables from the area.”40 The police
were to keep the homeless moving in order “to sanitize”41 the parks and
streets. Raids upon the campsites of the homeless were relentless, and their
belongings were often summarily destroyed at the site.42
31
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History is repeating itself. On July 28, 2006, the New York Times in
an article entitled “Please Don’t Feed the Homeless in Parks”43 reported that
Las Vegas had enacted an ordinance banning giving food to the homeless.
A violation of the ordinance can be punished by a maximum fine of
$1,000.00 and a jail term of up to six months.
II.
Thesis
If America’s Post-Katrina response to its unprecedented surge of
homelessness is to harass the homeless by jailing them or jailing those who
feed the homeless, the issues and remedies addressed in Pottinger become
relevant anew.
III.
Pottinger Revisited
a.
The Eighth Amendment
The most sensitive issue in homelessness litigation concerns the
voluntariness of the homeless defendant’s actions. Purely involuntary acts
cannot properly or morally be condemned as crimes under the Eighth
Amendment. To punish a person for his involuntary act would be cruel. The
question then is whether a homeless person’s acts are voluntary. A homeless
person who commits rape cannot reasonably assert his homelessness as
justification for his misdeeds. In that case his status as a homeless person is
irrelevant, and society cannot reasonably be expected to tolerate such
behavior. The question is more complex when a homeless defendant with
nowhere else to go is prosecuted for harmless acts such as sleeping in a park.
Is a public action “voluntary” when the homeless defendant must perform it
to survive, and he has no private place in which to perform the action? The
Pottinger court resolved the question by asking another question: Is the
defendant voluntarily homeless?44 If a defendant has voluntarily chosen to
be homeless, he could be legally and morally deemed to have voluntarily
assumed the risk of having to break the law to survive. It is unreasonable for
society to lower its expectation of public conduct in order to accommodate a
private and voluntary choice of that character. On the other hand, the
defendant’s homelessness is involuntary, a just society should not prosecute
43
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him for the indicia that attach to the fact of his homelessness. The success
of the Pottinger case rested in large part upon the plaintiffs’ ability to prove
that they were suffering an involuntary45 state of homelessness and were
compelled to perform life-sustaining acts in public view.46
The U.S. Supreme Court in Robinson v. California47 held that a
defendant could not be criminally punished for his mere status as a drug
addict, finding that a statute that made it punishable to be addicted to
narcotics constituted cruel and unusual punishment.48 In Powell v. Texas49
the Supreme Court addressed a similar issue of whether an alcoholic could
be jailed for appearing drunk in public.50 The Supreme Court held that
Powell had not been jailed for merely being addicted to alcohol, but for his
active conduct of appearing in public in a drunken state.51 Powell is often
cited by municipalities that arrest the homeless. The argument is that the
homeless are not being punished for being homeless, but for their actions in
violation of the law. Such arguments miss the point when the defendant is
involuntarily homeless. The alcoholic, theoretically, can restrict his drinking
to his home and avoid punishment, but the homeless have no homes in
which to perform what are usually private acts.52 Sleeping in parks, sitting
on sidewalks, and begging are perfect examples. To criminalize such
actions when they are unavoidable is tantamount to prosecuting the
homeless for existing, and the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishments is impermissibly infringed.
The burden has historically been upon the plaintiffs to establish that
their public actions were in fact unavoidable. In Pottinger the plaintiffs met
that burden with statistical evidence and expert testimony.53 The plaintiffs
offered irrefutable statistical evidence of the severe shortage of beds in
homeless shelters54 in Miami when they were arrested. The expert witnesses
also testified that people seldom choose to be homeless.55 However, a public
45
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policy that requires the homeless to bear the burden of proving the
voluntariness of their status is inherently flawed. The homeless, by
definition, are persons with extremely limited resources, and they are not
entitled to state appointed attorneys in civil litigation in defense of their
rights. But for the pro bono advocacy of the American Civil Liberties
Union,56 the Pottinger plaintiffs would have lacked the resources to amass
statistics proving Miami’s shelters were inadequate to house the homeless
population. Nor would the homeless have been able to procure the experts57
who were pivotal in establishing that people are seldom homeless by
choice.58 The better public policy would allow the plaintiff to meet the
burden of a prima facie case by establishing the actions committed by the
state or municipality in violation of his rights and the fact of his
homelessness at the time of his arrest. The burden should then shift to the
defendants to establish to a preponderance that the plaintiff is voluntarily
homeless and thus answerable for his public actions. This policy would
serve dual meritorious purposes: The homeless plaintiff would be enhanced
in his ability to find counsel who would accept his case, and the states and
their municipalities would have greater motivation to cease their efforts to
harass the homeless out of their towns and instead explore serious options
for providing adequate affordable housing.
b.
The Fourth Amendment
The homeless are gravely concerned about the conservation of those
meager resources that they still have. In Miami the police frequently
destroyed the belongings of the homeless onsite,59 treating the property as
public rubbish. On one particularly notorious raid, the Miami police
handcuffed a group of homeless individuals, piled their clothing,
medications, and a Bible together, and burned them while the homeless
watched.60 The homeless contended that the police seized and destroyed
their property without due process of law in direct violation of the Fourth
Amendment.61
56
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While a seizure of property occurs when there is a “meaningful
interference” with an individual’s interest in that property,62 a seizure of
property is unreasonable only if the state’s legitimate interests in the seizure
do not outweigh the individual’s legitimate expectation of privacy in the
object of the search.63 The inquiry then is whether the plaintiffs have a
legitimate expectation of privacy in personal property that may appear to
others to be public rubbish. Determining the nature of any legitimate
expectation of privacy in personal property involves two separate inquiries:
first, whether the individual has a subjective expectation of privacy in the
objects;64 and, second, whether that expectation is one that society should be
prepared to recognize as reasonable.65 If the homeless make efforts to protect
their belongings by attempting to shelter them from public view, stacking
them in organized piles, or designating another homeless person to guard
them, there is evidence of subjective expectation of privacy. The second
inquiry is more difficult. Should the public recognize the homeless person’s
right to privacy when her property is littering the streets or public parks? In
Rakas v. Illinois66 the United States Supreme Court offered guidelines for
determining the legitimacy of a plaintiff’s privacy interests. If the plaintiff is
a trespasser or he leaves his property accessible to the public, he may lose
his privacy interests in his property; whereas, one who is lawfully upon
property and shields his property from public view may retain a subjective
expectation in privacy that the public will recognize. The term trespasser is
turned on its head, and loses its definition “when there is nowhere”67 private
that a homeless person can lawfully be and so he remains upon public
property.
The Supreme Court has not specifically spoken to the issue of whether
a homeless person living outdoors has a privacy interest in their property
that the public would find reasonable, but a Connecticut court has addressed
the issue in part. In State v. Mooney,68 the court recognized a right of
privacy in the closed duffel bags of the homeless deriving from society’s
previous deferential treatment in closed containers, stating:
62
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[the interior of [these items is, in effect, the defendant’s last shred of
privacy from the prying eyes of outsiders, including the police. Our
notions of custom and civility, and our code of values, would include
some measure of respect for that shred of privacy, and would
recognize it as reasonable under the circumstances of this case.69
Does a homeless person have a lesser interest in his clothing or
medications because he has no duffel bag in which to enclose them? From
the perspective of the homeless, the answer is self- evident.
Correspondingly, however, the municipalities also have a legitimate interest
in the sanitation and safety of public spaces,70 which can be compromised by
the accumulation of rubbish. The Pottinger court balanced the conflicting
interests, holding that the homeless had a legitimate expectation of privacy
in their property so long as the property did not create a public danger.71 The
court held that the city was free to confiscate items such as mattresses with
exposed springs because such items posed a clear danger. However, the
practice of destroying the non-harmful possessions such as Bibles, clothing,
eyeglasses, medications, and personal identification was enjoined and
declared in violation of the Fourth Amendment.72
c.
Procedural Due Process
Ordinances that prohibit the homeless from performing innocent,
necessary functions in public often fail for vagueness or overbreadth. A
statute is vague when it fails to give fair notice of the forbidden conduct.73
Vagrancy ordinances were held void in Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville74 by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1972 because the statutes did
not give sufficiently clear notice of the behavior that was prohibited.75
Loitering statutes have suffered the same fate. In 1983, the U.S. Supreme
Court overturned California’s loitering statute that required citizens
wandering the streets to produce identification upon the request of a police
officer.76
69
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Oddly, the homeless plaintiffs did not attack Miami’s ordinances on a
vagueness theory. Instead the plaintiffs focused upon the unconstitutional
overbreadth of the ordinances when they were applied to innocent conduct
of the homeless.
A statute is overbroad when it reaches constitutionally protected
conduct or conduct which is beyond the power of the state to regulate.77 A
challenge based upon overbreadth will be upheld if the enactment reaches “a
substantial amount”78 of constitutionally protected conduct. Prior to
Pottinger there was no precedent for acts such as eating, sleeping, and sitting
to enjoy constitutional protection, unless such acts could be characterized as
expressive conduct.79 For the most part, however, when the homeless eat,
sleep, and sit in public, they intend no expressive conduct. They are
performing those acts for the same reasons the housed perform them: they
are necessary to survival. However, the Pottinger court held that when an
involuntarily homeless person performs such acts in public “at a time of day
when there is no place they can lawfully be,”80 the statute becomes
overbroad when it punishes innocent conduct, and the Fourth Amendment
due process clause is impermissibly infringed.81
d.
The Right to Travel
The United States has recognized the right to travel as a fundamental
right in 1941 in Edwards v. California.82 The U.S. Supreme Court
reaffirmed the Edwards decision in Shapiro v. Thompson,83 striking down a
Connecticut statute denying public assistance to persons who had not been
residents of the state for one year, opining that the statute discouraged travel
by the poor by withholding benefits from those who would otherwise
qualified to receive them.84 In 1972, the Supreme Court in Memorial
Hospital v. Maricopa County85 struck down a statute that conditioned free
77
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medical care upon a one-year residency requirement.86 This case is
especially significant in homelessness cases because the Supreme Court
specifically denounced the statute for denying indigents “the basic
necessities of life”87 and for the deterrent affect such statutes have on the
rights of the poor to migrate.
Because the right to travel is a fundamental right, statutes or
ordinances infringing that right must be in furtherance of a compelling state
interest88 and they must represent the least intrusive method for furthering
those state interests.89 State interests such as maintaining public spaces in
order to promote tourism, business, and developing inner city downtown and
park areas are not compelling interests. The United States Supreme Court
has held that such interests are substantial,90 but not compelling. Further, the
practice of arresting the homeless is not narrowly tailored to achieving the
goals of promoting tourism or developing business. The involuntarily
homeless arrested under such laws have no recourse but to return to their
public lives upon their release from custody, and nothing is ultimately
accomplished by the arrests. If cities wish to promote their attractiveness to
business and tourism, they must address both short-term and permanent
housing for their homeless populations.
e.
42 U.S.C. 1983
Every person who, under color of any statute or ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the constitution or laws, shall be
liable to the injured person in an action in law suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress….”

86

Id. at 250
Id. (Memorial Hospital argued that treating the homeless and other indigents over-burdened the tax base
of Arizona’s taxpayers. The court held that “a state may not protect the public finances by drawing an
invidious distinction between classes of its citizens,” effectively discriminating by wealth and property.
See, Jane B. Barron, “The ‘No Property’ Problem: Understanding Poverty by Understanding Wealth,” 102
Mich. L. Rev. 1000, (2004)
88
Personnel Administrators v. Feeney, 942 U.S. 256, 266 (1979)
89
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr. 473 U. S. 432, 439-440 (1985)
90
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In 1961 the United States Supreme Court reinvigorated civil rights
protections that had largely remained dormant for some ninety years. In
Monroe v. Pape91 the Supreme Court concluded that a party injured by the
unconstitutional actions of police offices could recover damages in federal
court under 1983. The police broke into the Monroe home, rousted them
from bed, and ransacked the house.92 Mr. Monroe was arrested, but was not
allowed to call his attorney.93 He was not promptly arraigned. Monroe
claimed that he suffered an unlawful search and seizure in Violation of the
Fourth Amendment.94 He further claimed that his constitutional rights had
been violated by the detention. The Supreme Court reversed the lower
court’s dismissal of the claims against the police officers,95 opining inter alia
that actions of the police may be actionable when they are in violation of
rights secured by the constitution.
Municipalities may also be held liable for the actions of city officials
when those officials act to execute a “policy or custom, whether made by its
lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent
official policy.”96 In 1983 litigation the homeless plaintiffs also bear the
burden of establishing that the actions were both persistent and
widespread.97 Evidence that the actions were isolated would be legally
insufficient to warrant relief against the municipality,98 though the offending
officers might remain liable for the actions.
Discovery in Pottinger revealed internal memoranda that were
“directed to high-ranking police department officials”99 regarding the need
to oust the homeless from Miami’s public areas. The persistent and
widespread nature of the attacks on the homeless was a matter of public
record. Over thirty-five hundred homeless individuals had been arrested in
Miami when suit was filed. The city could not escape liability under 1983
for its acts of purposeful harassment of the homeless.100
91

Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961)
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93
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f.
Equal Protection:
In Harper v. State Board of Elections101 the United States Supreme
Court opined that “wealth, like race, creed, or color is not germane to ones
ability to participate in the electoral process. Lines drawn on the basis of
wealth or property, like those of race are traditionally disfavored.”102
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has declined every opportunity to grant the
homeless the suspect classification that is afforded to other historically
victimized groups. This status is critical to the homeless population since
only those state laws that discriminate against suspect groups are subjected
to strict scrutiny,103 and cannot stand unless the state demonstrates a
compelling interest that is furthered by a narrowly tailored policy.104
The Supreme Court has adopted the following criteria in its suspect
class analysis: (1) whether the disadvantaged class is defined by a trait that
frequently bears no relationship to ability to contribute to society, (2)
whether the class has been saddled with unique disabilities because of
prejudice and inaccurate stereotypes; and (3) whether the trait defining the
class is immutable.105 The homeless can make a strong claim to being a
suspect or quasi-suspect class.
The homeless are a class defined by their abject poverty, and that state
of poverty frequently bears no relationship to an actual inability to contribute
to society. Many of the homeless have strong work histories106 and were
rendered homeless by events beyond their control,107 and one has only to
review the acts perpetrated against the homeless in Miami, San Francisco,
and San Diego to be persuaded of the dangerous prejudice of the public
against the homeless. The last prong of the test is more difficult. Do the
homeless have defining, immutable characteristics? If the term means
literally “a characteristic that cannot be changed,” the homeless must fail in
their attempts to achieve suspect classification. The judicial history of the
term does not, however, suggest so rigid a definition. Aliens, who enjoy
101
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protection as a suspect class, can become citizens, thereby changing their
“immutable” characteristic. Gender, which is protected, can be altered
surgically, thus altering the gender characteristic. The mere fact that the
homeless can again become housed does not alter the fact that while one is
in fact homeless, it is physically apparent to society.
The Supreme Court in Lyng108 adopted a broader interpretation of
immutability, including an enquiry as to whether the class members “exhibit
obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a
discrete group.”109 The homeless have glaringly distinguishing
characteristics: They reside under bridges, sleep in parks, shelters and other
public places, and they beg. Their identity is unmistakable: the best evidence
the police had no trouble whatever identifying them in Miami, in San
Francisco, and in San Diego.
The Aftermath
Litigation in Pottinger spanned a decade. Ultimately, the court
enjoined the city of Miami from arresting its homeless so long as they ere
not engaged in conduct harmful to others or themselves.110 Miami was
ordered to establish “safe zones”111 in areas where the homeless could access
food programs and health services. The parties ultimately negotiated a
financial settlement for the homeless plaintiffs.112
The impact of the case was immediate. Both the city of Miami and
other private entities constructed shelters for the homeless while the case
was on appeal.113 As word spread about the decision in Miami, other cities
took stock of their own practices. Fort Lauderdale, Florida stopped its “bum
sweeps”114 and began encouraging its officers to refer the homeless to social
services in lieu of making arrests.115
108
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IV
Conclusion
As America’s homeless population reaches five million after
Hurricane Katrina, Pottinger-type abuses such as those in Las Vegas are to
be anticipated unless society becomes pro-active. Congress must reinforce
incentives for constructing low-income housing and raise the minimum
wage. Meanwhile, “safe areas” must be available to those who have nowhere
else to go, and human resources must be provided to patrol those areas to
protect homeless men, women, and children from the violence of the streets.
The homeless must be afforded a “suspect class” designation. The
homeless are America’s most vulnerable population. They are easily
identified and despised for characteristics they cannot readily change. They
have suffered the deprivation of the most fundamental rights because their
very existence frightens the greater population on a visceral level. The goal,
however, is not only to place the homeless in a better position to defend their
constitutional rights, but to create a society that does not complain of
“compassion fatigue,” but instead is indefatigably compassionate and
committed116 to the welfare of even its poorest citizen.
116

America’s largest religions all urge their followers to a commitment to the less fortunate.
“A Muslim asserts his/her belief in the merciful and compassionate God by donating money or
goods to those less fortunate. This idea is connected to the belief in Islam that all wealth
ultimately belongs to God. We have it on loan to be used in God’s path to do good deeds in this
life.” Dr. James Pavlin, “An Islamic View on Caring For Those in Need,” IRF Newsletter #51Spring 2003.
“The Jewish community has historically seen itself responsible to feed and house the hungry and
the homeless. In fact in Hebrew times there is no word for charity. Rather, the caring for those in
need is called Tzedaka, a derivative of the Hebrew term for righteousness.” Rabbi N. I. Barowitz,
“A Jewish View on Hunger and Homelessness,” IRF Newsletter.
“When we give to others without any desire or expectation, when we let go of our attachments, we
find ourselves relieved of the complications that worldly possessions often bring with them. This
means while charity can be done for religious purposes, it should be done because the individual
enjoys helping others and the benefits are self-satisfying.”
Netta Mehta, “A Hindu View on Hunger and Homelessness,” IRF Newsletter #48-May/June 2002

“The Gospel call to be close to Christ who is “homeless” is an invitation to all the baptized to examine their
own lives, and to trust their brothers and sisters with practical solidarity by sharing their hardships. By
openness and generosity, as a community and as individuals, Christians can serve Christ present in the poor
and bear witness to the Father’s love.” 1997 Lenten Message from Pope John Paul II
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